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77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the by Odd Arne, et al. Westad

By Odd Arne, et al. Westad

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Read or Download 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina 1964-1977. Working Paper No. 22. Cold War International History Project. PDF

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Extra info for 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina 1964-1977. Working Paper No. 22. Cold War International History Project.

Example text

The domino theory, then, was absolutely correct—as far as beliefs, hopes, and intentions were concerned. How the Theory Was Right It was always a presumption within the international communist movement that a successful seizure of power in one country would be used as a stepping stone to promote revolution in others, through political, financial and military means, although not in the form of outright military invasions. The communists saw their international movement both as a means of achieving national liberation for oppressed peoples and as an instrument for world revolution.

The Kremlin also changed its Vietnam policy, becoming more supportive to Hanoi’s policies. In New Year Greetings sent in December 1964, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin promised Hanoi “all necessary aid” for the DRV in its struggle,81 a promise he reiterated during his trip to Hanoi two months later. 80 Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng in the talk with a VWP Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) delegation in Beijing on 12 April 1969. In the talk on 17 November 1968, hearing Pham Van Dong, who said that “what Chairman Mao has said is very correct, very suitable for the situation in our struggle against the US,” Mao corrected him, saying that some of his thinking “is not necessarily correct” and actual developments should be referred to.

S. acts of war against the DRV and the withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam. Yet, as Pham Van Dong told journalist Harrison 66 Talk with Chairman Mao on 17 November 1968. Talk on 23 September 1970. S. ” The first offensive was the statement by DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh on 28 January 1967, and the second was his statement on December 29 the same year. Both statements insisted that the United States unconditionally cease all acts of war against the DRV before talks could begin.

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